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Abstract
Experimental evidence suggest that most people only use few iterations of strategic reasoning, and
that some people systematically use less iterations than others. In this paper, we present a novel
evolutionary foundation for these stylized facts. In our model, agents interact in a ﬁnitely repeated
Prisoner's Dilemma, and each agent is characterized by the number of steps he thinks ahead. When
two agents interact, each of them has an independent probability to observe the opponent's type.
We show that if this probability is not too close to 0 or 1, then the evolutionary process admits a
unique stable outcome, in which the population includes a mixture of naive agents who think 1
step ahead, and moderately-sophisticated agents who think up to 3 steps ahead.
KEYWORDS: Indirect evolution, evolutionary stability, proper equilibrium, cognitive hierarchy,
bounded forward-looking, Prisoner's Dilemma, Cooperation. JEL Classiﬁcation: C73, D03.
1 Introduction
Experimental evidence suggest that in new strategic interactions most people only use few
iterations of strategic reasoning. This can be observed in diﬀerent forms in various contexts.
First, when playing long ﬁnite games, people only look a few stages ahead and use backward
induction reasoning to a limited extent. For example, players usually defect only at the last
couple of stages when playing ﬁnitely-repeated Prisoner's Dilemma, (see, e.g., Selten and
Stoecker (1986)) and Centipede games (McKelvey and Palfrey (1995); Nagel and Tang
(1998)), and when interacting in sequential bargaining, players ignore future bargaining
opportunities that are more than 1-2 steps ahead (Neelin, Sonnenschein, and Spiegel (1988);
∗I would also like to express my deep gratitude to Itai Arieli, Vince Crawford, Eddie Dekel, Ariel Ru-
binstein, Peyton Young, and seminar participants at University of Birmingham, University of Oxford and
University College London, for many useful comments, discussions and ideas.
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Johnson, Camerer, Sen, and Rymon (2002)). Secondly, when facing iteratively dominated
strategies, almost everyone makes the ﬁrst iteration (not playing a dominated action), many
do the second iteration - assume that their opponent does not play dominated strategies, a
few make the third iteration, and further iterations are rare (Costa-Gomes, Crawford, and
Broseta (2001); Rapoport and Amaldoss (2004); Costa-Gomes and Crawford (2006)). Third,
according to the models of cognitive hierarchy (or level-k), most players best reply to a belief
that others use at most two iterations of strategic reasoning (Stahl and Wilson (1994); Nagel
(1995); Ho, Camerer, and Weigelt (1998); Bosch-Domenech, Montalvo, Nagel, and Satorra
(2002); Camerer, Ho, and Chong (2004); Crawford and Iriberri (2007)).
A second stylized fact is the heterogeneity of the population: some people systemically
use less iterations than others (Chong, Camerer, and Ho (2005); Costa-Gomes and Crawford
(2006)). These observations raise two related evolutionary puzzles. The ﬁrst puzzle is
why people only use few steps. Several experiments (e.g., Crawford (2008); Camerer (2003,
Section 5.3.5)) suggest that using more iterations is only unintuitive but not computationally
complex (at-least in simple games): with appropriate guidance and feedback players can learn
to use more iterations. In many games, being able to do one more step than the opponent
gives a substantial advantage. As the cognitive cost of an additional level is moderate, it
is puzzling why there was not an arms race in which people learned to use more strategic
iterations throughout the evolutionary process (red queen eﬀect, see Robson (2003)).
The second puzzle is how the naive people, who systematically use less iterations than
the more sophisticated agents, survived the evolutionary process. At ﬁrst glance, it seems
that sophisticated agents would outperform naive agents due to the beneﬁt of thinking one
level ahead. In this paper we present an evolutionary model that explains both puzzles and
yields a unique sharp prediction: an heterogeneous population of naive agents and moderately-
sophisticated agents, in which everyone uses only 1-3 strategic iterations. Our model focuses
on bounded forward-looking in repeated Prisoner's Dilemma. We believe that it can also
shed light on other forms of bounded iterative reasoning.
Following the indirect evolutionary approach (Güth and Yaari (1992)) we present a
reduced-form static analysis for a dynamic process that describes the evolution of types in
a large population of agents.1 This process can be interpreted in two diﬀerent ways: (1)
biological process - types are genetically determined, and the payoﬀ is the expected number
of oﬀspring; and (2) learning and imitation process - an agent's type describes the way he
perceives strategic interactions; once in a while an agent may decide to change his strategic
1 The indirect approach was mainly used to study evolution of preferences, and it is related to the literature
on strategic delegation (e.g., Fershtman, Judd, and Kalai (1991)). Following, Stahl (1993); Stennek (2000);
Frenkel, Heller, and Teper (2012), we apply it to analyze evolution of cognitive biases.
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C D
C A,A A+1,0
D A+1,0 1,1
Tab. 1: Payoﬀ at the symmetric stage game Prisoner's Dilemma (A > 3.15).
framework and imitate another person's type, if the other person is more successful.
At each generation the agents in the population are randomly matched and each couple
plays M times (without rematching) the symmetric stage game of the Prisoner's Dilemma
with the payoﬀs given in Table 1:2 mutual cooperation (both players play C) yields both
players A > 3.15, mutual defection (both players play D) gives 1, and if a single player
defects, he obtains A + 1 and his opponent gets 0. Note that the parameter A is the ratio
between what can be gained by mutual cooperation to the additional payoﬀ that is obtained
by defecting.3
Each agent in our model has a type (level) in the set {L1, ..., LM} that determines how
many steps he looks ahead. An agent of type Lk looks k steps ahead in his strategic reasoning.
When the horizon (the number of remaining stages) is larger than k the agent must follow
a simple heuristic. We assume that this heuristic satisﬁes two properties: (1) nice (never
be the ﬁrst player to defect), and (2) retaliating - defect if the opponent defected in the
previous stage. Two examples for such heuristics are grim and tit-for-tat.4 When the
horizon is equal to k, the agent begins to play strategically and he may choose any action.
We interpret Lk's behavior to stem from bounded forward-looking: when the horizon is larger
than k, he subjectively perceives it to be inﬁnite, and he does not take into account the fact
that the interaction has a well-deﬁned ﬁnal period, and that this ﬁnal period has strategic
implications. One can also consider our model as a reduced-form for an interaction with a
random unknown long length, in which each type Lk gets a signal about the interaction's
realized length, k periods before the end (as discussed in Section 7). Note that the set of
strategies of type Lk is a strict subset of the set of strategies of type Lk+1, and that type
LM is fully-rational and is not limited in his choice of strategy.
2 All our results are independent of the value of M (given that M ≥ 4). The assumption A > 3.15 is
required for the solution we characterize below to be evolutionary stable in a non-empty interval of p-s.
3 We assume that defection yields the same additional payoﬀ (relative to cooperation) regardless of the
opponent's strategy to simplify the presentation of the result. The results remain qualitatively similar also
without this assumption. Given this assumption we normalize, without loss of generality, the payoﬀ of being
a single cooperator to be 0, and the additional payoﬀ of defecting to be 1.
4 Grim heuristic defects if and only if the opponent defected in the past, and Tit-for-tat heuristic defects
if and only if the opponent defected in the previous stage. In Section 7 we discuss the extension of our model
to a setup in which a player may choose his heuristic for long horizons, and the relation to the notion of
analogy-based expectation equilibrium (Jehiel (2005)).
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We assume that types are partially observable in the following way (similar to Dekel,
Ely, and Yilankaya (2007)): before the interaction begins, each agent has an independent
probability p to observe his opponent's type.5 Informally, this can be interpreted as an
opportunity to observe your opponent's past behavior, or to observe a trait that is correlated
with the cognitive level (such as I.Q. level, see Gill and Prowse (2012)). The total payoﬀ
of an agent of type Lk is the undiscounted sum of payoﬀs in the repeated prisoner dilemma
minus an arbitrarily small cost that is increasing in k (a marginal cost for having a better
forward looking-ability).
We capture the stable points of the dynamic evolutionary process by adapting the notion
of evolutionary stable strategy (ESS, Maynard-Smith (1974)) to a setup with diﬀerent types.
In such a setup, the state of the population is described by a conﬁguration - a pair consisting
of a distribution of types and the (possibly mixed) strategy that each type uses in the game.
A conﬁguration is evolutionary stable if any suﬃciently small group of mutants who invades
the population is outperformed by the incumbents in the post-entry population.6
Evolutionary stability can be sustained by playing very badly when facing types outside
the support of the distribution. However, this is unlikely to be stable in the long run, as
the strategies played against non-existing types should slowly evolve into better strategies,
as a response to recurrent entrees of mutants. Thus, we reﬁne evolutionary stability by also
requiring properness (Myerson (1978)). In Section 6 we show that our results are robust to
various plausible changes in the deﬁnition of stability in this setup.
Our main result shows that if p is not too close to 0 and 1 (and this interval is increasing
in A), then there exists a unique proper evolutionary stable conﬁguration, which includes
two kind of players: (1) naive agents of type L1 who only begin defecting at the last stage,
(2) moderately-sophisticated agents of type L3: usually they defect two stages before the end,
unless they observe that their opponent is sophisticated, and in this case, they begin defecting
one stage earlier. The stability relies on the balance between the direct disadvantage of naive
agents - they defect too late, and the indirect commitment advantage - when naivety is
being observed by a moderately-sophisticated opponent, it serves as a commitment device
that allows an additional round of mutual cooperation. The proportion of the naive players
is increasing in both p and A.
It is interesting to note that stable conﬁgurations are very diﬀerent when p is close to
0 or 1. In both cases, stable conﬁgurations must include fully-rational players who, when
5 The results remain the same if agents were only able to observe lower opponents' type (see Section 6).
6 The mutants achieve the same payoﬀ if they are equivalent to the incumbents: have the same distri-
bution of types and play the same on-equilibrium-path. If they are not equivalent, we require the mutants
to obtain a strictly lower payoﬀ.
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facing other fully-rational agents, defect at all stages. When p is close to 0, types are too
rarely observed, and the indirect advantage of naive agents is too weak. When p is close
to 1, there is an arms-race between sophisticated agents who observe each other: each
such agent wishes to defect one stage before his opponent. The result of this race is that
there must be some fully-rational agents in the population. The characterization of stable
conﬁgurations in the entire interval p ∈ [0, 1] are presented in Table 2 in Section 5.
Existing evolutionary models that studied bounded strategic reasoning (Stahl (1993);
Stennek (2000)) focused on the case where types are unobservable (p = 0) , and showed that
in various games: (1) the most sophisticated type always survives, and (2) lower (more naive)
types can also survive if they do not play serially dominated strategies. Recently, Mohlin
(2012) showed that there may be evolutionary stable conﬁgurations in which the highest
type do not survive, and he also studied the case in which higher types can perfectly observe
lower types (a case similar to p = 1, see Section 6).7 This paper is the ﬁrst to introduce
partial observability in this setup. Partial observability yields to a sharp and qualitative
diﬀerent prediction: only naive and moderately-sophisticated agents survive.
Existing experimental results verify the plausibility of both our assumption of using nice
and retaliating heuristics for large horizons, and of our main prediction. Selten and Stoecker
(1986) study the behavior of players in iterated Prisoner Dilemma games of 10 rounds.8 They
show that: (1) if any player defected, then almost always both players defect at all remaining
stages, (2) usually there is mutual cooperation in the ﬁrst 6 rounds, and (3) players begin
defecting at the last 1-4 rounds.9 Such behavior has two main explanations in the literature:
(1) some players are altruistic, and (2) players have limited forward-looking.10 Johnson,
Camerer, Sen, and Rymon (2002) studied the relative importance of these explanations in a
related sequential bargaining game, and their ﬁndings suggest that limited forward-looking
is the main cause for this behavior.
A recent qualitative support for our result is given in Hyndman, Terracol, and Vaksmann
(2012), which experimentally studied the strategic behavior of people across diﬀerent games.
They showed that a fraction of the players consistently assign a low level of reasoning to
7 See also Crawford (2003) for a strategic (non-evolutionary) model of zero-sum games with cheap-talk
in which naive and sophisticated agents may co-exist and obtain the same payoﬀ.
8 Similar results are presented in Andreoni and Miller (1993); Cooper, DeJong, Forsythe, and Ross (1996);
Bruttel, Güth, and Kamecke (2012).
9 In Selten and Stoecker (1986)'s experiments players engaged in 25 sequences (super-games) of iterated
Prisoner's Dilemma. The above results describe the behavior of subjects in the last 13 sequences (after
the initial 12 sequences in which players are inexperienced and their actions are noisier). During these 13
sequences there is a slow drift in the behavior of players towards earlier defections. Nevertheless, defections
before the last 4 rounds were infrequent also in the last couple of rounds.
10 Heifetz and Pauzner (2005) explain this behavior with diﬀerent cognitive limitations: at each node, each
player has a small probability to be confused and choose a diﬀerent action than the optimal one.
2 Model 6
their opponent, while the remaining players alternate between diﬀerent assessments of their
opponent's cognitive skill. The former fraction corresponds to naive agents in our model
who best-reply to a belief that the opponent does not have any forward-looking ability. The
remaining players correspond to the moderately-sophisticated agents who, depending on
the signal they obtain, best reply to diﬀerent beliefs about the opponent's ability.
The paper is structured as follows. Section 2 presents our model. In Section 3 we show
that the conﬁguration described above, in which levels L1 and L3 co-exist, is evolutionary
stable. In Section 4 we prove uniqueness. Section 5 characterizes the stable conﬁgurations
for low and high p-s. Section 6 demonstrates that our results are robust to various changes
in the model. We conclude in Section 7.
2 Model
2.1 Strategies and Types
We study a symmetric ﬁnitely-iterated Prisoner's Dilemma game that repeats M stages
(M ≥ 4). The payoﬀs of each stage game are described in Table 1. This payoﬀ is interpreted,
as standard in the evolutionary literature, as representing success or ﬁtness. Deﬁne the
horizon of a stage as the number of remaining stages including the current stage. That is,
the horizon at stage m is equal to M −m + 1. History hm of length m is a sequence of m
pairs, where the l-th pair describes the actions chosen by the players at stage l. Let Hm
be the sets of histories of length m, and let H = ∪1≤m<MHm be the set of all non-terminal
histories.
A pure strategy s is a function from H into {C,D}, and a behavioral strategy σ is a
function from H into ∆ ({C,D}). Let S (Σ) be the set of pure (behavioral) strategies. With
some abuse of notation, we also treat behavioral strategy σ ∈ Σ as a mixed strategy, and
denote by σ (s) the probability that strategy σ assigns to the pure strategy s. Behavioral
strategy (henceforth, strategy) σ is k-nice-retaliating if whenever the horizon is larger than k:
(1) σ assigns probability 1 to C if the opponent has never defected before, and (2) σ assigns
probability 1 to D if the opponent has defected in the previous stage. Let Σk (Sk) be the
set of k-Nice-Retaliating behavioral (pure) strategies. Let dk ∈ Sk be the pure strategy that
plays grim as long as the horizon is strictly larger then k (defects if and only if the opponent
has defected in the past), and always defect at smaller horizons. Let D = {dk}0≤k≤M be the
set of all such grim-then-defect strategies. Let u (σ, σ′) be the expected payoﬀ of a player
who plays strategy σ against an opponent who plays σ′.
We imagine a large population, in which at each generation agents are randomly matched,
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and each pair of agents play the repeated Prisoner's Dilemma. Diﬀerent agents in the
population diﬀer in their cognitive abilities, which is captured by their type. Let L =
{L1, ..., LM} be the set of types (or levels).11 An agent of type Lk looks only k steps ahead,
and when the horizon is larger than k he ignores end-of-game strategic considerations and
plays a nice and retaliating heuristic . That is, an agent with type Lk can only play k-nice-
retaliating strategies. Note that when the horizon is at most k, the agent is no longer limited
in his play.
Let c : L → R+ be a strictly increasing function satisfying c (L1) = 0, and let δ > 0.
Agents of type Lk bear a cognitive cost of δ · c (Lk). In what follows, we focus on the case
where δ is suﬃciently small (arbitrarily low cognitive costs). The payoﬀ of the repeated
game is the undiscounted sum of the stage payoﬀs minus the cognitive cost.
Following the model of partial observability of Dekel, Ely, and Yilankaya (2007), we
assume that each player observes the type of his opponent with probability p (and get no
information about his opponent's type with probability 1 − p), independently of the event
that his opponent observes his type. In Section 6 we demonstrate that our results remain
the same also if agents can only observe lower types. Finally, We use the term stranger to
describe an opponent that his type was not observed.
2.2 Conﬁgurations
The state of the population is described by a conﬁguration - a pair consisting of a distribution
of types and the strategy that each type uses in the game. Formally (where C (µ) denote
the support of µ):
Deﬁnition 1. Conﬁguration (or population) (µ, β) is a pair where µ ∈ ∆ (L) is a distribution
of types, and β = (βk)k∈C(µ) is the proﬁle of signal-dependent behavioral strategies that is
played by each type. That is, for each type Lk ∈ C (µ), βk : L∪∅ → Σk is a signal-dependent
strategy that speciﬁes a behavioral k-nice-retaliating strategy for each possible observation
about the opponent's type (including observations outside C (µ)).
Given a conﬁguration (µ, b), we call the types in C (µ) existing types or incumbents, and
types outside C (µ) are called non-existing types or mutant types.
Remark 1. We note two points regarding Deﬁnition 1:
• A conﬁguration also determines the strategies that are used against non-existing types.
In Section 6 we propose an alternative stability notion, according to which, the state
11 We explicitly omit level 0 (L0, who uses a nice and retaliating heuristic throughout the entire interaction).
The results are qualitatively the same if L0 is included (see Section 6.1.1).
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of the population only determines the strategies that are used against existing types
(similar to the deﬁnition of a conﬁguration in Dekel, Ely, and Yilankaya (2007)).
• Agents of type Lk can use a behavioral (non-pure) strategy. As usual in such models,
this can be interpreted as either: (1) each agent randomly chooses his actions, or (2)
diﬀerent fractions of type Lk play diﬀerent pure strategies.
Next, we deﬁne the mixture of two conﬁgurations as follows:
Deﬁnition 2. Let (µ, β) and (µ′, β′) be conﬁgurations, and let 0 <  < 1. The mixture
conﬁguration
(
µ˜, β˜
)
= (1− ) · (µ, β) +  · (µ′, β′) is:
• µ˜ = (1− ) · µ+  · µ′.
• For each k ∈ C (µ˜):
β˜k =
(1− ) · µ (Lk) · βk +  · µ′ (Lk) · β′k
µ (Lk) + µ′ (Lk)
.
When  is small we interpret (1− ) · (µ, β)+  · (µ′, β′) as a post-entry conﬁguration after
population of incumbents in state (µ, β) was invaded by mutants with conﬁguration (µ′, β′).
Finally, we deﬁne that two conﬁgurations are equivalent if they have the same distribution
and they induce the same observed play. Formally:
Deﬁnition 3. Conﬁgurations (µ, β) and (µ′, β′) are equivalent ((µ, β) ≈ (µ′, β′)) if:
1. µ = µ′.
2. For each pair of types Lk, Lk′ ∈ C (µ), the observed play when type Lk plays against
type Lk′ is the same in both conﬁgurations.
Note that that following the invasion of  mutants, the incumbents in each of two equiv-
alent conﬁgurations may act very diﬀerently when facing these mutants.
3 Evolutionary Stability
3.1 Deﬁnition
In a model without types, the state of the population is described by a strategy. A strategy
is neutrally (resp., evolutionary) stable if any suﬃciently small group of mutants who invades
the population and plays an arbitrary strategy would achieve a weakly (strictly) lower payoﬀ
than the incumbents. Formally:
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Deﬁnition 4. (Maynard-Smith (1974); Maynard Smith (1982)) Strategy σ ∈ Σ is neutrally
(resp., evolutionary) stable if for any mutant strategy σ′ (resp., σ′ 6= σ) there exists some
σ′ ∈ (0, 1) such that for every 0 <  < σ′ :
u (σ, σ′ + (1− )σ) ≥ u (σ′, σ′ + (1− )σ) .
(resp., u (σ, σ′ + (1− )σ) > u (σ′, σ′ + (1− )σ)).
In what follows we extend the notion of evolutionary stability from strategies to conﬁgu-
rations. Given two conﬁgurations (µ, b) and (µ′, b′) deﬁne u ((µ, b) , (µ′, b′)) as the expected
payoﬀ of a player from population (µ, b) who plays against an opponent from population
(µ′, b′) (and the type of each player is observed with independent probability p). A con-
ﬁguration is neutrally (evolutionary) stable if any suﬃciently small group of mutants who
invades the population would obtain a weakly (strictly) lower payoﬀ than the incumbents in
the post-entry population. Formally:
Deﬁnition 5. Conﬁguration (µ, β) is neutrally (resp., evolutionary) stable if for any mu-
tant conﬁguration (µ′, β′) (resp., any (µ′, β′) 6≈ (µ, β)) there exists some σ′ ∈ (0, 1) such
that for every 0 <  < σ′ :
u ((µ, β) ,  (µ′, β′) + (1− ) (µ, β)) ≥ u ((µ′, β′) ,  (µ′, β′) + (1− ) (µ, β)) .
(resp., u ((µ, β) ,  (µ′, β′) + (1− ) (µ, β)) > u ((µ′, β′) ,  (µ′, β′) + (1− ) (µ, β)) .)
Remark 2. Note that:
1. Any evolutionary stable conﬁguration is also neutrally stable.
2. Evolutionary stable conﬁgurations are only weakly stable to invasions of mutants who
are equivalent to the incumbents (have the same distribution of types and play the
same on-equilibrium-path).
3. Deﬁnition 5 is closely related to Maynard Smith (1982)'s Deﬁnition 4 in two ways:
(a) When the set of types is a singleton, then Deﬁnition 5 and Deﬁnition 4 coincide.
(b) Consider a 2-player meta-game in which each player chooses type Lk and a
signal-dependent k-nice-retaliating strategy. Note that a mixed strategy in this
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game is a conﬁguration. A symmetric strategy proﬁle in this meta-game is a
neutrally stable strategy if and only if it is a neutrally stable conﬁguration.12
With some abuse of notation we denote by Lk also the distribution that assigns mass
1 to type Lk. It is well-known that any neutrally stable strategy is a Nash equilibrium.
Proposition 4 (in Appendix A.1) shows that the strategy proﬁle b in neutrally stable conﬁg-
uration (µ, b) is: (1) balanced - all incumbents obtain the same payoﬀ, and (2) Bayes-Nash
equilibrium in the Bayesian game with distribution of types µ.
3.2 Result (Stability)
Our ﬁrst result characterizes an evolutionary stable conﬁguration, (µ∗, b∗) , in which naive
players (type L1) and moderately-sophisticated players (type L3) co-exist. Let the conﬁgu-
ration (µ∗, b∗) be deﬁned as follows:
1. The population includes only types L1 and L3:
µ∗ (L1) =
p · (A− 1)− 1 + δ · c (L3)
p · (A− 1) , µ
∗ (L3) =
1− δ · c (L3)
p · (A− 1) .
2. The naive Agents of type L1 play d1 : play grim until the last stage, and defect at
the last stage.
3. The moderately-sophisticated agents of type L3 play:
(a) d2 against strangers and observed L1 (follow grim until the last 2 stages, and
defect at the last 2 remaining stages).
(b) d3 against any observed type diﬀerent then L1.
Theorem 1. Let A
(A−1)2 < p <
A−1
A
and let δ > 0 be suﬃciently small. Then (µ∗, b∗) is
evolutionary stable.
The formal proof appears in Appendix A.2. In what follows we brieﬂy sketch the outline
of the proof. First, we show that b∗ is a Bayes-Nash equilibrium (given µ∗), and that type
L3's strategy is a best-reply also in the entire unrestricted set of strategies Σ (and not only
in Σ3). It is immediate that naive players best reply (in Σ1). For moderately-sophisticated
12 An evolutionary stable conﬁguration may only be a neutrally stable strategy in the meta-game as
meta-strategies that only deviate oﬀ-equilibrium-path yield the same payoﬀ as the incumbents in the
post-entry-population.
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(henceforth, sophisticated) players, playing d3 against non-naive opponents is strictly better
than an earlier defection for small enough p, and playing d2 against strangers and naive
opponents is strictly better than earlier defections if µ (L1) is large enough.
Next, we show that (µ∗, b∗) is balanced. In order to show this, we compare the ﬁtness
of naive and sophisticated agents against diﬀerent opponents. Naive agents succeed more
against an observing sophisticated opponent (who observed their type), because their ob-
served naivety induces an additional round of mutual cooperation. Sophisticated agents
achieve a better payoﬀ in the two other cases: against naive opponents and against an un-
observing sophisticated opponent. This implies that there is a unique level of µ (L1) that
balances the payoﬀ of the two kinds of players.
Finally, we use these two properties to show resistance to mutations. If  more players of
type L1 (L3) join the populations, then due to the previous arguments, they would have a
strictly lower payoﬀ than the incumbents (on average). Mutants of type L2 are outperformed
due to their inability to defect one stage earlier against an observed type L3. Mutants of
types L4 or more are outperformed due to their higher cognitive costs.
4 Uniqueness
4.1 Properness
The interaction admits additional evolutionary stable conﬁgurations. One such conﬁguration
is described in the following example.
Example. Consider the conﬁguration that assigns mass 1 to fully-rational agents (type
LM) who deviate at all stages against any observed opponent's type. One can see that
this conﬁguration is evolutionary stable. However, the stability relies on the incumbents
defecting at all stages against naive mutants (L1). Such a strategy is strictly dominated by
an alternative strategy that cooperates for the ﬁrst M − 2 stages against naive opponents.
Thus, in the long run, as a response to recurrent entrees of naive mutants, incumbents
are expected to evolve into cooperating at the ﬁrst stages of the game when facing naive
opponents, and the stability of the conﬁguration will be lost.
Motivated by this example, we reﬁne neutral stability by requiring properness (Myerson
(1978)). We begin by formally deﬁning properness in this setup. A conﬁguration is interior
if every type has positive probability and every pure strategy (consistent with the type) is
played with positive probability.
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Deﬁnition 6. Conﬁguration (µ, β) is interior if for each types Lk, Lk′ ∈ L and for each
k-nice-retaliating pure strategy sk ∈ Sk: (1) µ (Lk) > 0, (2) βk (∅) (sk) > 0, and (3)
βk (k
′) (sk) > 0.
Given some  > 0, interior strategy conﬁguration (µ, β) is -proper if for every types
Lk, Lk′ ∈ L and every signal-dependent k/k'-nice-retaliating signal-dependent pure strategies
bk ∈ Sk and bk′ ∈ Sk′ :
u ((Lk, bk) , (µ, β)) < u ((Lk′ , bk′) , (µ, β)) ⇒ µ (Lk) · β (bk) ≤  · µ (Lk′) · β (bk′) .
A conﬁguration is proper if it is the limit of some -proper equilibria when → 0:
Deﬁnition 7. Conﬁguration (µ, β) is proper, if for some sequence (n)n≥1, there exist n-
proper interior conﬁgurations (µn, βn) such that (µn, βn) → (µ, β). That is, µn → µ, and
for each type Lk satisfying µ (Lk) > 0 and for each pure strategy sk ∈ Sk: (1) βnk (∅) (sk)→
βk (∅) (sk), and (2) for each Lk′ ∈ L :βnk (k′) (sk)→ βk (k′) (sk).
Remark 3. Note that:
1. It is immediate to see that in every proper conﬁguration (µ, b) the proﬁle b is a balanced
Bayes-Nash equilibrium.
2. Deﬁnition 7 is closely related to Myerson (1978)'s deﬁnition of proper equilibrium:
(a) When the set of types is a singleton, then Deﬁnition 5 and Myerson (1978)'s
deﬁnition coincide.
(b) Consider again the 2-player meta-game in which each player chooses type Lk
and signal-dependent k-nice-retaliating strategy. A symmetric (mixed) strategy
proﬁle in this meta-game is a proper equilibrium if and only if it is a proper
conﬁguration.
3. van Damme (1987) showed for normal-form games without types that evolutionary sta-
bility implies properness. As demonstrated by the conﬁguration in the example above,
this is not true in our setup.13 Note that in any interior conﬁguration, cooperating
in the ﬁrst M − 2 stages gives a strictly better payoﬀ when facing an observed type
L1. This implies that always defecting against type L1 cannot be played with positive
probability in a proper conﬁguration.
13 Recall that our setup diﬀers in two main aspects: (1) having diﬀerent types, and (2) a weaker notion of
evolutionary stability that allows deviations oﬀ-equilibrium-path to yield the same payoﬀ as the incumbents.
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A conﬁguration is a proper naturally (evolutionary) stable if it is both proper and nat-
urally (evolutionary) stable. In Section 6.2 we show that our results remain the same if
one replaces properness with a weaker perfection notion that only requires players to use
undominated strategies against mutant types.
4.2 Result (Uniqueness)
It is straightforward to show that (µ∗, b∗) is proper (Prop. 5, proved in Appendix A.3). Our
next result shows that any proper neutrally stable conﬁguration is equivalent to (µ∗, b∗).14
Theorem 2. Let A > 4.57 and A
(A−1)2 < p <
A−1
A
. Then for a suﬃciently small δ > 0, if
(µ, β) is a proper neutrally stable conﬁguration, then it is equivalent to (µ∗, b∗).
The sketch of the proof is as follows (see Appendix A.4 for the formal proof). First,
observe that a conﬁguration with a single type is not stable: (1) if the type is LM , then
the entire population defects all the time, and mutants of type L1 would induce cooperation
against them and by this, outperform the incumbents; and (2) if the type is Lk 6= LM , then
mutants of type Lk+1 can invade the population. Let Lk1 be the smallest (naive) type in
the population. Then, it is immediate to see that type Lk1 must always defect when the
horizon is at most k1 (as it is common knowledge that all players are rational at that stage),
and all other types must defect when the horizon is at most k1 + 1.
The next step is to show that a large fraction of the non-naive population must cooperate
at all horizons larger than k1 + 1 when facing strangers. Otherwise, a small increase in the
frequency of the naive players (type Lk1), would improve their ﬁtness relative to the non-naive
agents (as many non-naive agents defect too early against unobserved naive opponents), and
this implies instability. The fact that this fraction is so large, implies that if there are non-
naive players who defect at earlier horizons than k1 + 1 against strangers, then: (1) the large
fraction who defects at horizon k1 + 1 against strangers must belong to type Lk1+1, and (2)
all the remaining non-naive players must defect at horizon k1 + 2 against strangers. This
characterization allows us to ﬁnd the unique distribution of types that satisﬁes the balance
of payoﬀs among the diﬀerent types, but it turns out that this distribution is not stable to
small perturbations in the frequency of the incumbents.
Finally, if all non-naive players defect at horizon k1 + 1 against strangers, then it implies
that they all defect at horizon k1 + 2 against observed non-naive opponents, and the balance
between the payoﬀs of the diﬀerent types implies that the frequency of naive and non-naive
14 The assumption A > 4.57 is required to have uniqueness in the entire interval A
(A−1)2 < p <
A−1
A . For
lower A-s (as discussed in the appendix) the uniqueness may hold only in a sub-interval.
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players is the same as in µ∗. Finally, we show that if k1 > 1, then the conﬁguration can be
invaded by mutants of type L1, who would outperform the incumbents by inducing more
mutual cooperation when being observed by the opponents.
5 Stability for Low and High p-s
Our main results (Theorems 1-2) characterized the unique stable conﬁguration in the interval
A
(A−1)2 < p <
A−1
A
. In this section we characterize the stable conﬁgurations in the remaining
intervals: low p-s (below A
(A−1)2 ) and high p-s (above
A−1
A
), and show that the stable conﬁg-
urations are qualitatively diﬀerent at these intervals. In both cases, stable conﬁgurations (if
they exist) must include fully-rational players who, when facing other fully-rational agents,
defect at all stages.
When p is close to 0, this occurs because the indirect advantage of lower types is too small
and they cannot exist in a stable conﬁguration (because the probability of being observed
by the opponent is too low). For very low values of p-s, it implies that there exists a unique
stable conﬁguration, in which everyone is fully-rational and always defect. For low, but less
extreme, values of p-s no stable conﬁgurations exist.
When p is close to 1, there is an arms-race between sophisticated agents who observe
each other: each such agent wishes to defect one stage before his opponent. The result of
this arm-race is that in any stable conﬁguration (is such a conﬁguration exists) there must
be some fully-rational agents in the population, and these fully-rational players defect at the
ﬁrst stage when they observe a fully-rational opponent. Formally (see proof in Appendix
A.5):
Theorem 3. Let δ > 0 be suﬃciently small and assume that A > 4.57. Then:
1. Let 0 ≤ p < 1
(M−2)·(A−1) . Then there exists a proper evolutionary stable conﬁguration(
µ˜, b˜
)
where all players have type LM and they play dM against strangers and type
LM , and dk+1 against observed mutant type Lk < LM . Moreover, any other neutrally
stable conﬁguration is equivalent to
(
µ˜, b˜
)
.
2. Let 1
(M−2)·(A−1) < p <
A
(A−1)2 . Then no proper neutrally stable conﬁgurations exist.
3. Let A
(A−1)2 < p <
A−1
A
. Then (µ∗, b∗) is a proper evolutionary stable conﬁguration.
Moreover, any other neutrally stable conﬁguration is equivalent to (µ∗, b∗).
4. Let A−1
A
< p ≤ 1. Then in any proper neutrally stable conﬁguration there is a positive
frequency of players of type LM , and these players defect at all stages when observing
an opponent of type LM .
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Tab. 2: Characterization of Proper Evolutionary Stable Conﬁgurations
Interval
Example
(A,M = 10)
Characterization of Proper
Evolutionary Stable Conﬁgurations
0 ≤ p < 1
(M−2)·(A−1) 0 ≤ p < 1%
(
µ˜, b˜
)
- Only fully-rational agents who
defect at all stages.
1
(M−2)·(A−1) < p <
A
(A−1)2
1% < p < 12% No stable conﬁgurations exist.
A
(A−1)2 < p <
A−1
A
12% < p < 90%
(µ∗, b∗) - Naive (L1) and
moderately-sophisticated agents (L3)
co-exist.
A−1
A
< p < 1 90% < p ≤ 1 Necessary condition for stability: fully
rational agents exist.
Parts 1 and 4 are proved in Appendix A.5. Parts 2 and 3 are immediately implied by
Corollary 1 and Lemma 7 in the Appendix. Table 2 summarizes the properties of stable
conﬁgurations in the diﬀerent areas of the interval p ∈ [0, 1] (for suﬃciently small δ).
6 Robustness
In this section we demonstrate that our results are robust to plausible variants in: (1) the
types and the signals (Section 6.1), (2) the perfection reﬁnement (Section 6.2), and (3) the
stability notion (Section 6.3).
6.1 Variants in the Types and Signals
6.1.1 Level 0
In the model we do not allow players to belong to level-0 (L0) who follow a nice and
retaliating strategy at all rounds of the interaction. Such level-0 players play a strictly-
dominated strategy (cooperating at the last stage). We chose to omit them from the model as
such an extreme cognitive limitation seems implausible because playing strictly-dominated
strategies yields substantial looses when playing against Nature.
We note that our results are qualitatively robust to the addition of type L0. Speciﬁ-
cally,the main result (Theorems 1-2) would only shift a single step backwards: the naive
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players in the unique stable conﬁguration (µ∗, b∗) would have type L0 instead of L1, and the
moderately-sophisticated players would have type L2.
6.1.2 Asymmetric Type Observability
In the model we assume that any agent has the same probability to observe his opponent's
type. In particular, lower types may identify the exact type of a more sophisticated opponent.
One may argue (see, e.g., Mohlin (2012)) that it is more plausible that only higher types can
identify the types of their opponents. We formalize this alternative assumption as follows.
Before the interaction begins each agent independently obtains a signal about his opponent.
With probability 1 − p the signal is non-informative (∅). With probability p the signal is
informative:
1. If the opponent's type is strictly lower, then the agent exactly identiﬁes it.
2. If the opponent's type is weakly higher, then the agent only observes that his oppo-
nent's type is weakly higher than his own type.
One can see that all of our results remain the same in this setup.
6.1.3 Small Perturbations to the Signal Structure
Our results remain qualitatively similar if the signal structure is slightly altered by any of
the following perturbations:
1. A small positive correlation between the signal that each agent obtains about his
opponent's type.
2. A small chance that the informative signal is incorrect.
That is, if the perturbation is small enough, then there exists a unique proper evolutionary
stable conﬁguration which is closed to (µ∗, b∗)).
6.2 Weaker Perfection Reﬁnement - Undominated Conﬁgurations
One may argue that the properness reﬁnement is too strong for capturing the intuition
that incumbents in stable conﬂagrations cannot play badly against mutant types. In this
section we present a weaker perfection reﬁnement, which only requires incumbents to play
undominated strategies against mutant types, and we show that our uniqueness result holds
also with respect to this notion.
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The payoﬀ of an incumbent's strategy that is played against a mutant type, depends
on that mutant's strategy. One may expect that most of the time invading mutants will
best-reply to the incumbents because either (see, Swinkels (1992)): (1) best-reply mutants
have higher ﬁtness than other mutants, and thus they are expected to survive longer in the
post-entree population; or/and (2) mutants choose their strategy by experimentation, and
they are more likely to choose best-reply strategies. Formally:
Deﬁnition 8. Let (µ, b) be a conﬁguration and let Lk˜ ∈ L\C (µ) be a mutant type.
A signal-dependent strategy b˜k˜ : L ∪ ∅ → Σk˜ is a best-reply if u
((
Lk˜, b˜k˜
)
, (µ, b)
)
≥
u
((
Lk˜, b
′
k˜
)
, (µ, b)
)
for each alternative signal-dependent strategy b′
k˜
: L ∪ ∅ → Σk˜.
An incumbent strategy bk
(
k˜
)
is dominated by another strategy b′k
(
k˜
)
if it yields a
strictly worse payoﬀ against all best-reply strategies of mutants of type Lk˜. Strategy bk
(
k˜
)
is undominated if it is not dominated by any other strategy. Formally:
Deﬁnition 9. Let (µ, b) be a conﬁguration, let Lk ∈ C (µ) be an incumbent type, let
Lk˜ ∈ L\C (µ) be a mutant type, let b′k
(
k˜
)
∈ Σk be a strategy, and for each k′ 6= k˜ let
b′k (k
′) = bk (k′). Strategy bk
(
k˜
)
∈ Σk is dominated by b′k
(
k˜
)
if for each best-reply signal-
dependent strategy b˜k˜ : L ∪ ∅ → Σk˜: u ((Lk, bk) , (Lk˜, bk˜)) < u ((Lk, b′k) , (Lk˜, bk˜)). Strategy
bk
(
k˜
)
∈ Σk is undominated if it not dominated by any strategy b′k
(
k˜
)
∈ Σk.
A conﬁguration is undominated if it only includes undominated strategies. Formally:
Deﬁnition 10. Conﬁguration (µ, b) is undominated, if for each incumbent type Lk ∈ C (µ)
and for each mutant type Lk˜ ∈ L\C (µ), the strategy bk
(
k˜
)
is undominated.
A Conﬁguration is undominated neutrally (evolutionary) stable if it is both undominated
and neutrally (evolutionary) stable.
Proposition 6 in Appendix A.3 shows that any proper conﬁguration is undominated. It
is straightforward to see that the proof of our uniqueness result (Theorem 2) also works for
the weaker notion of undominated, and thus we get the following result (proof is omitted):
Proposition 1. Let A > 4.57 and A
(A−1)2 < p <
A−1
A
. Then for a suﬃciently small δ > 0, if
(µ, β) is an undominated neutrally stable conﬁguration, then it is equivalent to (µ∗, b∗).
6.3 Diﬀerent Stability Notions
6.3.1 Focal Stability
One may argue that it is more plausible that the state of the population only speciﬁes the
behavior of players against existing types, and the behavior against mutants that introduce
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new types should be determined by a post-entry adaptation process (see, e.g., Dekel, Ely,
and Yilankaya (2007)). In what follows we formalize this idea, and present an alternative
notion of focal stability (which may be of independent interest in future research), and state
that all our results remain the same with this stability notion .
A compact conﬁguration is a pair consisting of a distribution of types and the strategy
that each type uses against other types in the support of the distribution. Formally:
Deﬁnition 11. Compact Conﬁguration (µ, b) is a pair where µ ∈ ∆ (L) is the distribution of
types in the population, and b = (bk)Lk∈C(µ) is the proﬁle of signal-dependent strategies that
is played by each type against strangers and incumbents. That is, for each type Lk ∈ C (µ),
bk : C (µ) ∪ ∅ → Σk is a signal-dependent k-nice-retaliating strategy.
Internal mutant conﬁgurations (µ′, b′) do not introduce new types to the population. that
is, they satisfy C (µ′) ⊆ C (µ). Internal mutants are interpreted as the combination of small
perturbations to the frequency of incumbent types, and experimentation of new strategies by
small groups of incumbents. A compact conﬁguration is internally neutrally (evolutionary)
stable if any suﬃciently small group of (non-equivalent) internal mutants would obtain a
weakly (strictly) lower payoﬀ than the incumbents in the post-entry population. Formally:
Deﬁnition 12. Compact conﬁguration (µ, b) is internally neutrally (evolutionary) stable if
for any internal mutant conﬁguration (µ′, b′) ((µ′, b′) 6≈ (µ, b)) with C (µ′) ⊆ C (µ) there
exists some σ′ ∈ (0, 1) such that for every 0 <  < σ′ :
u ((µ, b) ,  (µ′, b′) + (1− ) (µ, b)) ≥ u ((µ′, b′) ,  (µ′, b′) + (1− ) (µ, b)) .
(u ((µ, b) ,  (µ′, b′) + (1− ) (µ, b)) > u ((µ′, b′) ,  (µ′, b′) + (1− ) (µ, b)) .)
External mutants introduce a new type to the population. We assume that the incum-
bents and the new mutant interactively adapt their joint behavior, while taking the focal
behavior of incumbents against other incumbents and strangers as ﬁxed. We further assume
that this adaptation process is fast enough relative to the evolution of types, such that the
behavior in the post-entry population converges into a Bayes-Nash equilibrium (given the
focal ﬁxed play of the incumbents). A compact conﬁguration is (strictly) externally fo-
cally stable if any new mutant type would achieve a (strictly) worse payoﬀ in the induced
post-entree Bayes-Nash equilibrium. Formally:
Deﬁnition 13. Given compact conﬁguration (µ, b),  > 0 and mutant type Lk′ ∈ L\C (µ),
let B (µ, b, Lk′ , ) be the set of post-entree focal conﬁgurations (µ
′, b′) that satisfy:
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1. The post-entry distribution is a mixture of  mutants and 1 −  incumbents: µ′ =
(1− ) · µ+  · Lk′ .
2. Focal play: the incumbents continue to play the same as in the pre-entry conﬁguration
against strangers and other incumbents: b′k (∅) = bk (∅) for each Lk ∈ C (µ), (3)
b′k
(
k˜
)
= bk
(
k˜
)
for each Lk, Lk˜ ∈ C (µ).
3. Each incumbent type best replies when observing the mutant type Lk′ .
4. The mutant type Lk′ best replies to all opponents.
Deﬁnition 14. Compact conﬁguration (µ, b) is (strictly) externally focally stable if there
exists ¯ > 0 such that for every mutant type Lk′ ∈ L\C (µ) and 0 <  < ¯ the mutants
obtains a (strictly) lower payoﬀ in any post-entree focal conﬁguration (µ′, b′) ∈ B (µ, b, k′, ):
u ((µ, b′) , (µ′, b′)) ≥ u ((Lk′ , b′) , (µ′, b′)) .
(u ((µ, b′) , (µ′, b′)) > u ((Lk′ , b′) , (µ′, b′)) .)
Finally, a compact conﬁguration is (strictly) focally stable if it is both neutrally (evolu-
tionary) stable and (strictly) externally focally stable. Simple adaptations to the proofs in
the appendix yield the same result with focal stability. Formally (proof is omitted):
Proposition 2. Let A
(A−1)2 < p <
A−1
A
and let δ > 0 be suﬃciently small. Then the
compact conﬁguration (µ∗, b∗) is strictly focally stable. Moreover, if (µ, b) is a focally stable
conﬁguration then (µ, b) and (µ∗, b∗) are equivalent.
6.3.2 DEY-Stability (Dekel, Ely, and Yilankaya (2007))
In our deﬁnition of focal stability the incumbents only approximately best-reply in the post-
entry population, because they do not adjust their play against incumbents and strangers
to the presence of the new  mutants. In some evolutionary setups, the adaptation process
according to which agents choose their strategies might be much faster then the evolutionary
process according to which the frequency of the types evolve. In these setups, it may be
plausible to assume that the post-entree population adjust their play into an exact Bayes-
Nash equilibrium after any entree of mutants (both external and internal mutants).
Dekel, Ely, and Yilankaya (2007)'s notion of stability makes this assumption.15 A com-
pact conﬁguration (µ, b) is (strictly) DEY-stable if:
15 A similar approach is also used in the notions ofmental equilibrium (Winter, Garcia-Jurado, and Mendez-
Naya (2010)) and evolutionary-stable types (Alger and Weibull (2012)). Both notions apply only to homoge-
nous populations that includes a single type, and thus are less appropriate to study stability of heterogeneous
populations.
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1. The strategy proﬁle b is:
(a) A Bayes-Nash equilibrium in the Bayesian game with the distribution of types µ.
(b) Balanced - it induces the same payoﬀ to all types in C (µ).
2. For each mutant type Lk ∈ L, there exists suﬃciently small 0 such that for each
 < 0, after  mutants of type Lk invade the population:
(a) There exist post-entry Bayes-Nash equilibria in which the incumbents' play is
only slightly changed relative to the pre-entry play.
(b) In all these equilibria the mutants would achieve a (strictly) lower payoﬀ than the
incumbents.
With simple adaptations, Lemmas 1-5 apply also for DEY-stability. This immediately im-
plies that (µ∗, b∗) is strictly DEY-stable, and it is qualitative unique. That is, any other
DEY-stable conﬁguration satisﬁes similar qualitative properties: (1) naive agents (type L1)
and moderately-sophisticated agents (types in the set {L2, L3, L4}) co-exist, and (2) higher
levels of sophistication (L5 and above) do not exist. Formally:
Proposition 3. Let max
(
1
A−2 ,
2·A−1
A·(A−1)
)
< p < A−1
A
and let δ > 0 be suﬃciently small. Then
the compact conﬁguration (µ∗, b∗) is strictly DEY-stable. Moreover, any other DEY-stable
conﬁguration (µ, b) satisﬁes:
∑
k≤4
µ (Li) = 1, and 0 < µ (L1) < 1.
In this setup we only have the weaker qualitative uniqueness because Lemmas 6-7,
which are required for a stronger uniqueness, do not apply for DEY-stability. The lemmas
do not work in this setup because:
• Part (1) of Lemma 7 (and similarly, part (1) of Lemma 6) does not work because
small perturbations in the frequencies that diﬀerent actions are played cannot be rep-
resented as mutations in the setup of DEY-stability. Speciﬁcally, the lemma relies on
a perturbation which slightly increases the frequency of agents with type Lk˜ who play
d3 (instead of d2). This perturbation can be represented as a mutant conﬁguration in
the deﬁnitions of evolutionary stability and focal stability, but not in the deﬁnition of
DEY-stability. Note that immediately after such a perturbation, the incumbents who
play d3 obtain a strictly higher payoﬀ than those who play d2, but DEY-stability im-
plicitly assumes that the adjustment process into a new Bayes-Nash equilibrium works
in the opposite direction: some incumbents who played d3 change their play into d2.
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• Part (4) of Lemma 7 does not work because Dekel, Ely, and Yilankaya (2007)'s deﬁni-
tion only considers entry of mutants with a single type, and it turns out that for some
values of p, the 3-layer conﬁguration with a support of C (µ) = {L1, L2, L4} can only be
invaded by an heterogeneous mutant conﬁguration. Note that such an heterogeneous
invasion may simply represent a slight perturbation in the frequency of the diﬀerent
types in the population.
Finally, we note that if one adapts Dekel, Ely, and Yilankaya (2007)'s deﬁnition by assuming
that the adjustment into a new exact equilibrium takes place only after the entree of external
mutants, then all of our results, including the stronger uniqueness that is implied by Lemma
7, would hold.
7 Concluding Remarks
1. Other heuristics for long horizons: In our model we assumed that all players use
nice and retaliating heuristics whenever the horizon is larger than their forward-looking
ability. One could relax this assumption by allowing a player to choose his strategy
for long horizons from some ﬁxed set of heuristics. For example, the set of memory-1
strategies, which depend only on the actions of the previous stage. A strategy of a
player of type Lk in this setup speciﬁes two strategic components for each possible signal
about the opponent's type: (1) the memory-1 strategy he plays when the horizon is
larger than k, and (2) the (unrestricted) strategy he plays when the horizon is at most
k. It is immediate to apply our ﬁrst result (Theorem 1) to this setup, and to show
that a simple adaptation of (µ∗, b∗), in which all players choose a nice and retaliating
heuristic, is stable. We conjuncture that there are only two sets of stable conﬁgurations
in this extended setup: (1) eﬃcient conﬁgurations: type distribution and strategies are
equivalent to (µ∗, b∗), all players use nice heuristics, and a large enough proportion of
each existing type chooses a retaliating heuristic; and (2) ineﬃcient conﬁgurations in
which all players defect at all stages (and use always-defect heuristic).
2. Analogy-based expectation equilibrium: Our model of bounded forward looking
types could also be formulated using Jehiel (2005)'s Analogy-Based Expectation Equi-
librium (ABEE). In this formulation a player of type Lk bundles all nodes with horizon
of at least k into a single analogy class (while fully-diﬀerentiating among nodes with
horizons smaller than k), and expects his opponent to play the same in all nodes of
this class. The requirement that players play an evolutionary reﬁnement of a balanced
Bayesian-Nash equilibrium in a conﬁguration is replaced with the requirement that
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players play an analogous evolutionary reﬁnement of a balanced ABEE in a conﬁgu-
ration: at each stage every player best-replies to his analogy-based expectations, and
expectations correctly represent the average behavior in every class. As in the previ-
ous remark a simple adaptation of (µ∗, b∗) is stable in this setup, and and we have an
analogous conjuncture about the set of stable conﬁgurations.
3. Random continuation probability: Our model assumes that the repeated interac-
tion has a deterministic constant length, and that players completely ignore this fact
when the horizon is too large. These assumptions may seem unrealistic. However,
one should note that the model may be a reduced-form for a more realistic inter-
action with a random length and incomplete information. Speciﬁably, let T be the
random unknown length of the interaction. Assume that the interaction lasts at least
M rounds (Pr (T ≥M) = 1), and that the continuation probability at each stage
(Pr (T > n|T > n− 1)) is not too far from 1. Bounded forward-looking is modeled
in this setup as the stage in which a player becomes aware to the timing of the ﬁnal
period: player of type Lk gets a signal about the ﬁnal period of the interaction (i.e.,
about the realization of T) k stages before the end. In this setup, players are not re-
stricted in their strategies (each type may play any strategy at any horizon). Like the
previous remarks, a simple adaptation of (µ∗, b∗) is stable, and we have an analogous
conjuncture about the set of stable conﬁgurations.
4. Other games: The formal analysis deals only with iterated Prisoner's Dilemma.
However, we conjuncture that the results can be extended to other games in which
iterated reasoning decreases payoﬀs. In particular, the extension of our results to
centipede-like games (Rosenthal (1981)) is relatively straightforward. Such game can
represent sequential interactions of gift exchanges. Such interactions were important in
primitive hunter-gatherer populations (see, e.g., Haviland, Prins, and Walrath (2007),
P. 440), which driven the biological evolution of human characteristics.
A Proofs
A.1 Neutral Stability Implies Balanced Bayes-Nash Equilibrium
Proposition 4. Let (µ, β) be a neutrally stable conﬁguration. Then, the strategy proﬁle
β: (1) induces the same payoﬀ for each type in the support of µ, and (2) is a Bayes-Nash
equilibrium in the Bayesian game with distribution of types µ.
Proof.
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1. Assume to the contrary that β induces diﬀerent payoﬀs to diﬀerent types. Let Lk ∈
C (µ) be the type with the highest payoﬀ. Then: u ((Lk, βk) , (µ, β)) > u ((µ, β) , (µ, β)).
This implies that for suﬃciently small  > 0, mutants of type Lk who play βk would
achieve a strictly higher payoﬀ than the incumbents and this contradicts the stability.
2. Assume to the contrary that β is not a Bayes-Nash equilibrium. Let Lk ∈ C (µ) be
the type who does not play a best response against (µ, β). This implies that there
exists strategy β
′
k such that : u ((Lk, β
′
k) , (µ, β)) > u ((Lk, βk) , (µ, β)). By the ﬁrst
part of the proposition, u ((Lk, βk) , (µ, β)) = u ((µ, β) , (µ, β)). This implies that for
suﬃciently small  > 0, mutants of type Lk who play β
′
k would obtain a strictly higher
than the incumbents and this contradicts the stability of (µ, β).
A.2 Stability of (µ∗, b∗)
Theorem. 1 Let A
(A−1)2 < p <
A−1
A
and let δ > 0 be suﬃciently small. Then conﬁguration
(µ∗, b∗) is evolutionary stable.
Proof. In order to prove that is is neutrally stable, we ﬁrst show two auxiliary results: (µ∗, b∗)
is balanced (Lemma 1), and b∗ is a Bayes-Nash equilibrium (given µ∗) which is strict with
respect to on-equilibrium-path deviations (Lemma 2).
Lemma 1. Conﬁguration (µ∗, b∗) is balanced (induce the same payoﬀ to all types in C (µ∗)).
Proof. Let q = µ (L1) be the frequency of the naive players. A naive player gets (L− 1)·A+1
against a naive opponent, and (L− 2) ·A+ 1 against a sophisticated opponent (type L3). A
sophisticated player gets (L− 2) ·A+(A+ 1)+1 = (L− 1) ·A+2 against a naive opponent,
and against a sophisticated opponent he gets: (L− 3)A+3 if both players identify each other,
(L− 3) ·A+(A+ 1)+2 = (L− 2) ·A+3 if only he identiﬁes his opponent, (L− 3) ·A+0+2
if only his opponent identiﬁes him, and (L− 2) · A + 2 if both players identify each other.
Denote by δ3 = δ · c (L3) the cognitive cost of type L3. The diﬀerent types get the same
payoﬀ if:
q · ((L− 1) · A+ 1) + (1− q) · ((L− 2) · A+ 1) + δ3 = q · ((L− 1) · A+ 2) + (1− q) ·(
p2 ((L− 3)A+ 3) + p (1− p) (((L− 2) · A+ 3) + ((L− 3) · A+ 2)) + (1− p)2 ((L− 2) · A+ 2))
(1− q) ((L− 2)A+ 1− ((L− 3)A+ 1 + 2p2 + p (1− p) (A+ 2 + 1) + (1− p)2 (A+ 1)))+δ3 = q
q = (1− q) · (A− (2p2 + p (1− p) (A+ 3) + (1− p)2 (A+ 1)))+ δ3
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q = (1− q) (A− (p2 (2− A− 3 + A+ 1) + p (A+ 3− 2A− 2) + (A+ 1)))+ δ3
q = (1− q) (A− (p (1− A) + (A+ 1))) + δ3
q = (1− q) (−p (1− A)− 1) + δ3 = (1− q) (p (A− 1)− 1) + δ3
q (p (A− 1)− 1 + 1) = p (A− 1)− 1 + δ3
q =
p (A− 1)− 1 + δ3
p (A− 1) . (A.1)
Note that for each p > 1
A−1 we get a valid value of 0 ≤ q ≤ 1.
Lemma 2. Strategy proﬁle b∗ is a Bayes-Nash equilibrium given the distribution µ∗. More-
over: (1) players of type L3 best-reply in the unrestricted set of strategies Σ, and (2) any
deviation that induces a diﬀerent play on-equilibrium-path, yields a strictly worse payoﬀ.
Proof. It is immediate that naive players (type L1) best reply in Σ1, as their only choice
is between cooperating and defecting at the last stage, and the latter strictly dominates
the former. We have to show that a sophisticated player (L3) plays a best reply in the
unrestricted set Σ, and that it is strictly better than any deviation on-equilibrium-path. It
is immediate that d2 is a best reply against an observed naive opponent, and strictly better
than on-equilibrium-path deviations. Next, we show that playing d2 against a stranger is
strictly better than playing d3. This is true if the following inequality holds (looking at the
payoﬀs of the last 3 rounds, as all preceding payoﬀs are the same):
q · (2A+ 2) + (1− q) · (2p+ (1− p) · (A+ 2)) > q · (A+ 3) + (1− q) · (3p+ (1− p) · (A+ 3))
q · (A− 1) > (1− q) ⇔ q > 1
A
.
Using (A.1) one obtains:
p · (A− 1)− 1
p · (A− 1) >
1
A
⇔ p · A · (A− 1)− A > p · (A− 1)
p · A2 − p · A− A > p · A− p ⇔ p · (A2 − 2A+ 1) > A ⇔ p > A
(A− 1)2 .
It is immediate that d2 is also strictly better (against strangers) than any deviation on-
equilibrium-path. We are left with showing that it is strictly better for a sophisticated
player to play d3 and not d4 against a sophisticated opponent (and this immediately implies
that d3 is strictly better against identiﬁed sophisticated opponents than any deviation on-
equilibrium-path). This is true if the following inequality holds (focusing on the payoﬀs of
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the last 4 rounds, as all preceding payoﬀs are the same):
p · (A+ 3) + (1− p) · (2A+ 3) > p · (A+ 4) + (1− p) · (A+ 4)
(1− p) · (A− 1) > p ⇔ A− 1 > A · p ⇔ p < A− 1
A
.
We now use the lemmas to prove that (µ∗, b∗) is evolutionary stable. That is, we have
to show that after an invasion of  mutants with conﬁguration (µ, b) ((µ, b) 6≈ (µ∗, b∗)), the
incumbents obtain a strictly higher payoﬀ than the mutants in the post-entree population
(for suﬃciently small  > 0).
First, consider mutants of types L1 or L3. If these mutants play diﬀerently than their
counterpart incumbents on-equilibrium-path against incumbents (strangers, L1 or L3) then
they earn strictly worse by the previous lemmas. Denote mutants of types L1 or L3 who
play play like the incumbents (on-equilibrium-path) when facing incumbents and strangers as
imitating mutants. Note that when the proportion of naive agents become larger (smaller)
relative to its proportion in µ∗, then the naive agents achieve a lower (higher) payoﬀ than the
sophisticated agents. This is because naive agents obtain a strictly lower payoﬀ than sophis-
ticated agents, when facing naive opponents (the sophisticated players obtain an additional
ﬁtness point by defecting when the horizon is equal to 2). This implies that imitating
mutants obtain a strictly lower payoﬀ than the incumbents when facing incumbents or im-
itating mutants (unless the imitating mutants have the same distribution of types as the
incumbents, and then they obtain the same payoﬀ).
Next, consider mutants of diﬀerent types (L2 or L4 or higher). Mutants of type L2
achieve a strictly lower payoﬀ against incumbents: they have the same payoﬀ as L3 in most
cases, but they obtain a strictly lower payoﬀ when they observe an opponent of type L3
due to their inability to defect 3 stages before the end. Mutants of higher types (L4 or
more) obtain at most the incumbents' payoﬀ when facing incumbents, while they have a
strictly larger cognitive cost (δ · c (L4)). Thus these mutants achieve a strictly lower payoﬀ
than the incumbents. Finally, mutants may gain an advantage from a secret-handshake
like behavior (Robson (1990)) - playing the same against incumbent types and strangers,
while cooperating with each other when observing a mutant type (diﬀerent than L1 and L3).
However, for suﬃciently small , such an advantage cannot compensate for the strict losses
mentioned above, and this implies that any conﬁguration of mutants would be outperformed
by the incumbents.
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A.3 Proper and Undominated Conﬁgurations
We ﬁrst show that (µ∗, b∗) is a proper conﬁguration.
Proposition 5. Conﬁguration (µ∗, b∗) is proper.
Proof. Let the sequence of interior n -proper conﬁguration (µ
n, βn) that converge into
(µ∗, b∗) be deﬁned as follows (for brevity we only sketch the main details of the construction).
Each non-existing type Lk /∈ {L1, L3} has µn (L2) = O (n), while µn (L1) = µ (L1)− O (n)
and µn (L3) = µ (L3)−O (n). Type L1 (L2) plays with probability of 1−O (n) strategy d1
(d2), and plays with probabilities of O (n) or smaller magnitudes all other pure strategies in
Σ1 (Σ2) in a way that is consistent with n-properness. Any other type Lk plays with prob-
ability of 1−O (n) strategy b∗3, and plays with probabilities of O (n) or smaller magnitudes
all other pure strategies in Σk in a way that is consistent with n-properness. Observe that
such a conﬁguration is n -proper, and this implies the properness of (µ
∗, b∗).
Next we show that any proper conﬁguration is undominated (as deﬁned in Section 6.2).
Proposition 6. Let (µ, β) be a proper conﬁguration. Then it is undominated.
Proof. Assume to the contrary that there exists incumbent type Lk ∈ C (µ) and mutant
type Lk˜ ∈ L\C (µ) such that the strategy bk
(
k˜
)
∈ Σk is dominated. That is, there exists
alternative strategy b′k
(
k˜
)
∈ Σk that yields a strictly better payoﬀ against any best-reply
signal-dependent strategy b˜k˜ : L ∪ ∅ → Σk˜. If (µ, β) is an interior -proper conﬁgura-
tion suﬃciently close to (µ, β) then -properness implies that type Lk˜ plays a best-reply
signal-dependent strategy with probability of 1− O (). This, in turn, implies that type Lk
plays against Lk˜ strategy b
′
k
(
k˜
)
with a 1

-times higher probability than bk
(
k˜
)
, but then no
sequence of n-proper conﬁgurations can converge to (µ, β).
A.4 Uniqueness of (µ∗, b∗)
In this section we prove the uniqueness of (µ∗, b∗) in the interval A
(A−1)2 < p <
A−1
A
(Theorem
2). In addition, we show that there are no stable conﬁgurations in the interval 1
(A−1)·(M−2) <
p < A
(A−1)2 (Proposition 7, which is part (2) of Theorem 3).
Theorem. 2 Let A > 4.57, let A
(A−1)2 < p <
A−1
A
, and let δ > 0 be suﬃciently small. If
(µ, β) is a proper neutrally stable conﬁguration, then it is equivalent to (µ∗, b∗).
For A < 4.57, the corollary holds if p satisﬁes either:
max
(
1
A− 2 ,
2 · A− 1
A · (A− 1)
)
< p <
A− 1
A
or
1
(A− 1) · (M − 2) < p < 1−
2 · A− 1
A2 − A .
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Proposition 7. Let 1
(M−2)·(A−1) < p <
A
(A−1)2 , and let δ > 0 be suﬃciently small. Then no
proper neutrally stable conﬁgurations exist.
Both Theorem 2 and Proposition 7 follow immediately from Lemmas 3-7. First, Lemma
3 shows that proper neutrally stable conﬁguration must include more than one type in their
support, and the lowest type must be at most M − 2. Formally:
Lemma 3. Let (µ, β) be a conﬁguration such that β is a Bayes-Nash equilibrium given µ and
let δ > 0 be suﬃciently small. Let type Lk1 ∈ C (µ) be the smallest type in the population.
Then:
1. Everyone defects (with probability 1) at any horizon weakly smaller than k1.
2. Any type Lk 6= Lk1 in the population defects (with probability 1) at horizon k1 + 1.
3. If k1 < M and µ (Lk1) = 1 then the conﬁguration is not neutrally stable.
4. If k1 = M and
1
(M−2)·(A−1) < p then the conﬁguration is not proper neutrally stable.
5. If k1 = M − 1 then the conﬁguration is not neutrally stable.
6. If 1
(M−2)·(A−1) < p then: µ (Lk1) < 1 and k1 ≤M − 2.
Proof.
1. It is common knowledge that all types are at least k1. This implies that defecting
when the horizon is at most k1, defecting at all remaining stages is the unique strictly
dominance-solvable strategy. Thus, all players must defect with probability 1 when
the horizon is at most k1 given any signal about the opponent.
2. Part (1) implies that defecting is strictly better than cooperating at horizon k1 + 1.
3. Observe that if k1 < M , then  mutants of type Lk1+1 who play dk1+1 and enter the
population, would outperform the incumbents.
4. In any proper conﬁguration incumbents must cooperate in the ﬁrst M − 2 stages
when facing an observed mutant type L1 (as defecting at an early stage against L1 is
strictly dominated). Consider  mutants of type L1 who invade the population. With
probability 1 − p the mutant's type is unobservable and he would obtain 1 point less
than the incumbents (when facing an incumbent). With probability p the mutant is
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identiﬁed and he obtains (M − 2) · (A− 1)− 1 points more than the incumbents. This
implies the mutants would outperform the incumbents if:
1− p < p · ((M − 2) · (A− 1)− 1) ⇔ p > 1
(M − 2) · (A− 1) .
If the lowest type in the population is LM−1, then fully-rational agents (type LM)
outperform agents with type LM−1 and the conﬁguration cannot be neutrally-stable.
5. It is immediately implied by the previous parts.
Given a conﬁguration with more then one existing type, we call the lowest existing type
naive, and all other incumbents are dubbed non-naive types. Let a cooperative opponent
be an opponent who never defected so far in the game. The following lemma shows that if
everyone cooperates at all horizons strictly larger than k1 + 1 in a proper neutrally-stable
conﬁguration, then this conﬁguration must be equivalent to (µ∗, b∗).
Lemma 4. Let p < A−1
A
, let δ > 0 be suﬃciently small, let (µ, β) be a proper neutrally
stable strategy, and let type Lk1 ∈ C (µ) be the smallest type in the population. Assume that
µ (Lk1) < 1, k1 ≤ M − 2, and all types in the population cooperate at all horizons strictly
larger than k1 + 1 when facing cooperative strangers. Then:
1. No one defects at horizon strictly larger then k1 + 2 against any incumbent.
2. All non-naive incumbents play dk1+1 against strangers or observed type Lk1, and plays
dk1+2 against any non-naive observed incumbent (up to oﬀ-equilibrium-path deviations).
3. No player in the population has type strictly larger than Lk1+2.
4. The population only includes types {Lk1 , Lk1+2}.
5.
µ (Lk1) =
p (A− 1)− 1 + δ · (c (Lk1+2)− c (Lk1))
p (A− 1)
for any p > A
(A−1)2 , and no neutrally stable conﬁguration exists if p <
A
(A−1)2 .
6. If p > A
(A−1)2 , then (µ, b) and (µ
∗, b∗) are equivalent conﬁgurations.
Proof.
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1. We have to show that playing dk1+2 is strictly better then an earlier defection against an
observed non-naive incumbent. This is because defecting at horizon k1 + 3 (defecting
at horizon strictly larger than k1 + 3) yields A − 1 (at least 2 · (A− 1)) less points
than dk1+2 against an unobserving opponent and at most 1 (2) more points than dk1+2
against an observing opponent. Thus dk1+2 is strictly better than defecting at horizon
of at least k1 + 3 if:
(1− p) · (A− 1) > p ⇔ (A− 1) > A · p ⇔ A− 1
A
> p.
2. By part (2) of the previous lemma all non-naive incumbents play dk1+1 when facing
strangers or observed Lk1 . It is immediate that dk1+2 is strictly better than defecting
at horizon of at most k1 + 1 when facing an observed non-naive incumbent. By the
previous part, any incumbent with type strictly larger than Lk1+1 play dk1+2 against
observed non-naive incumbents. In order to complete the proof we have to show that
all non-naive incumbents have type diﬀerent then Lk1+1. Assume to the contrary that:
(I) all non-naive incumbents have type Lk1+1; this implies that mutants of type Lk1+2
who play dk1+2 against non-naive incumbents and dk1+1 against strangers or naive in-
cumbents, would outperform the incumbents; or (II) Some of the non-naive incumbents
have type Lk1+1 while other incumbents have higher types; then for suﬃciently small
δ > 0, the latter group outperforms the former.
3. Assume to the contrary that there are players of type strictly higher than Lk1+2. If
there are also incumbents of type Lk1+2 then the previous part shows that both groups
play the same on-equilibrium-path, and thus the agents with the strictly higher types
must obtain strictly lower payoﬀs due to the cognitive costs. Otherwise, any best-
reply mutant type Lk1+1 must play dk1+1 against strangers and naive incumbents (or
an equivalent strategy that only diﬀers oﬀ-equilibrium-path), and this implies that
in any proper conﬁguration, non-naive incumbents cannot defect at horizons strictly
higher than k1 + 2 when facing an observed mutant type Lk1+1. This implies that such
mutants would outperform the incumbents due to the cognitive costs.
4. This is immediate from the previous two parts.
5. In any balanced conﬁguration the naive and the non-naive incumbents must have
the same payoﬀ. By repeating the calculation of Lemma 1, this can only hold if
µ (Lk1) =
p(A−1)−1+δ·(c(Lk1+2)−c(Lk1))
p(A−1) > 0 . By repeating the calculations of Lemma 2,
this conﬁguration cannot be stable if p < A
(A−1)2 .
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6. If Lk1 = L1 then the previous parts imply that (µ, b) and (µ
∗, b∗) are equivalent con-
ﬁgurations. Assume to the contrary that k1 > 1. We now show that  mutants of type
L1 who invade the population would outperform the incumbents of type Lk1 (and this
immediately implies that the mutants also outperform the incumbents of type Lk1+2,
as the post-entree diﬀerence in the payoﬀs between the incumbents is O ()). When
facing an opponent of type Lk1 , the mutants obtain one less point. When facing an
unobserving opponent of type Lk1+2, both types L1 and Lk1fare the same. When facing
an observing opponent of type Lk1+2, the mutants obtain at least A − 1 more ﬁtness
points (by inducing the sophisticated opponent to postpone his defection). Thus the
mutants achieve a strictly higher payoﬀ if:
µ (Lk1) < p · (A− 1) · µ (Lk1+2) = p · (A− 1) · (1− µ (Lk1))
µ (Lk1) <
p · (A− 1)
1 + p · (A− 1)
By the previous part:
µ (Lk1) =
p (A− 1)− 1 + δ · (c (Lk1+2)− c (Lk1))
p (A− 1) <
p · (A− 1)
1 + p · (A− 1) ,
where the last inequality holds for a suﬃciently small δ > 0.
We now have to deal with the remaining case in which only a fraction of the non-naive
players cooperates at all horizons strictly larger than k1 + 1 when facing a stranger. First,
Lemma 5 shows that the frequency of the naive players is small, and that these naive players
must be of type L1, and that if p is not too small, then the population must include also
types L2 − L4 but no higher types.
Lemma 5. Let δ > 0 be suﬃciently small, let (µ, β) be a proper neutrally stable strategy,
let type Lk1 ∈ C (µ) be the smallest type in the population. Assume the that µ (Lk1) < 1,
k1 ≤M −2, and that there are agents who defect at horizons strictly larger than k1 + 1 when
facing cooperative strangers. Then:
1. µ (Lk1) ≤ 1A .
2. If p > 1
(A−1)2 , then Lk1 = L1.
3. If p > 2·A−1
A·(A−1) , then µ (L2) > 0.
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4. If µ (L2) > 0 and
A−1
A
> p > 1
A−2 then:
(a) No incumbent defects at horizons > 3 when facing cooperative strangers.
(b) No incumbent defects at horizons > 4 when facing any cooperative incumbent.
(c) No incumbent has type strictly higher than L4.
Proof.
1. The fact that there are incumbents who defect with with positive probability at hori-
zons strictly larger than k1+1 against strangers implies that early defection (at horizon
strictly earlier than k1+1) yields a weakly-better payoﬀ than dk1+1 against cooperative
strangers. Early defection at horizon k1 + 2 (>k1 + 2) yields at least A−1 (2 · (A− 1))
less ﬁtness points against naive agents, and at most 1 (2) more points against non-naive
opponents. This can hold only if:
µ (Lk1) · (A− 1) ≤ (1− µ (Lk1)) · 1
µ (Lk1) ≤
1
A
. (A.2)
Assume to the contrary that k1 > 1. Observe that  mutants of type L1 would out-
perform the incumbents of type Lk1(and thus would outperform all the incumbents in
the post-entry conﬁguration ) if:
p · (A− 1) · (1− µ (Lk1)) > µ (Lk1) · 1
This is because the mutants of type L1 earn at-least A − 1 more points when their
type is observed by a non-naive incumbent, they earn the same when their type is not
observed by a non-naive incumbent, and they earn at most 1 less point when playing
against a naive incumbent (type Lk1). Thus the mutants would achieve a strictly higher
payoﬀ if:
p · (A− 1) > µ (L2) · (1 + p · (A− 1)) ⇔ p · (A− 1)
1 + p · (A− 1) > µ (L2) .
Substituting (A.2) yields:
p · (A− 1)
1 + p · (A− 1) >
1
A
⇔ p · A · (A− 1) > 1 + p · (A− 1) ⇔ p > 1
(A− 1)2 .
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Assume to the contrary that µ (L2) = 0. The balance property implies that naive
players (L1) must have the same payoﬀ as the non-naive players. This can hold only
if:
p · (A− 2) · (1− µ (L1)) < (1− p) · (1− µ (L1)) · 2 + µ (L1) .
This is because naive players obtain (on average) at least A − 2 more ﬁtness points
when their type is observed by a non-naive opponent (as they induce their opponent
to cooperate at least one more round), and non-naive agents get at most 1 more
point against a naive opponent and at most 2 more points against a non-observing
sophisticated opponent. Thus:
(p · (A− 2)− 2 · (1− p)) · (1− µ (L1)) < µ (L1) ⇔ (p · A− 2) · (1− µ (L1)) < µ (L1)
(p · A− 2) < µ (L1) · (p · A− 1) ⇔ µ (L1) > p · A− 2
p · A− 1 .
Substituting (A.2) yields:
1
A
>
p · A− 2
p · A− 1 ⇔ p · A− 1 > p · A
2 − 2 · A ⇔ p · A2 − (2 + p) · A+ 1 < 0.
The last inequality holds if and only if p > 2·A−1
A·(A−1) and we get a contradiction.
2.
(a) Let µ (L3+) = 1 − µ (L1) − µ (L2). The balance property implies that types L1
and L2 obtain the same payoﬀ. This can hold only if:
p · µ (L3+) · (A− 1) < µ (L1) + µ (L2) + (1− p) · µ (L3+) .
This is because type L1 obtains A − 1 more ﬁtness points against an observing
opponent of type L3 or higher, while type L2 obtains 1 more point against types
L1 and L2 and at most 1 more point against an unobserving type L3 or higher.
Thus:
p · µ (L3+) · (A− 1) < 1− µ (L3+) + (1− p) · µ (L3+) = 1− p · µ (L3+)
p · µ (L3+) · A < 1 ⇔ µ (L3+) < 1
A · p.
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This implies, together with (A.2):
µ (L2) = 1− µ (L1)− µ (L3+) > 1− 1
A
− 1
A · p =
A · p− p− 1
A · p .
From the same argument as in part (1) of this lemma, if µ (L2) >
1
A
then no incum-
bent defects at horizon strictly larger than 3 when facing cooperative strangers.
Substituting this inequality yields:
1
A
<
A · p− p− 1
A · p ⇔ p < A · p− p− 1 ⇔ p >
1
A− 2 .
(b) The proof repeats the argument of part (2) of Lemma 4.
(c) The proof repeats the argument of part (3) of Lemma 4.
All the lemmas presented so far are also valid for the alternative notion of DEY-stability
(see Section 6.3). The following two lemmas do not hold for DEY-stability, as they rely on
the assumption that the incumbents stick to their pre-entry play when facing incumbents
and strangers. Using this assumption, we show in Lemma 6 that: (1) large fraction of non-
naive players cooperate at all horizons strictly larger than k1 + 1 when facing cooperative
strangers, (2) if p < 1− 2A−1
A2−A then no incumbent defects at horizon strictly larger than k1+2
when facing cooperative strangers, and (3) no incumbent has type higher than Lk1+3.
Lemma 6. Let p < 1− 2A−1
A2−A , let δ > 0 be suﬃciently small, let (µ, β) be a proper neutrally
stable strategy, let type Lk1 ∈ C (µ) be the smallest type in the population and assume the
that µ (Lk1) < 1 and k1 ≤M − 2. Let η be the mean probability that a non-naive incumbent
cooperates at all horizons strictly larger than k1 + 1 when facing a cooperative stranger.
Assume that η < 1. Then:
1.
η >
(A− 1) · (1− p)− 1
(A− 1) · (1− p) .
2. No player defects at horizon > k1 + 2 when facing cooperative strangers.
3. No player defects at horizon > k1 + 2 when facing cooperative incumbents.
4. No player in the population has type strictly larger than Lk1+3.
Proof.
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1. Type Lk1 gets (L− 1) ·A+ 1 points when playing against itself. A random player with
a type diﬀerent than Lk1 who plays against L1 gets at most (L− 1) ·A+ 1 + 1 when he
observes his opponent's type, and an expected payoﬀ of at most η · ((L− 1)A+ 2) +
(1− η) · ((L− 2) · A+ 3). This implies that a necessary condition for other types to
achieve a higher payoﬀ (on average) when playing against L1 than the payoﬀ that L1
gets against itself is (subtracting the equal amount of (L− 2) ·A+1 from each payoﬀ):
A < p · (A+ 1) + (1− p) · (η · (A+ 1) + 2 · (1− η))
A < 1 + p · A+ (1− p) · (η · A+ 1− η) ⇔ A− 1
1− p < η · A+ 1− η
A− 1− 1
1− p < η · (A− 1) ⇔ 1−
1
(A− 1) · (1− p) < η
(A− 1) · (1− p)− 1
(A− 1) · (1− p) < η (A.3)
If (A.3) does not hold, then the conﬁguration cannot be naturally stable, because a
suﬃciently small group of mutants with type L1 who invade the population and play
d1 would outperform the incumbents.
2. We show that when facing strangers, all types cooperate with probability 1 at all
horizons strictly larger than k1 + 2. Assume to the contrary that there is a type who
defects with positive probability against cooperative strangers at horizon l > k1 + 2.
This implies that defecting at horizon l yields a weakly better payoﬀ against strangers
than dk1+2. This can occur only if:
η · (1− p) · (A− 1) ≤ (1− η) + η · p.
This is because if l = k1 + 3 (l > k1 + 3), dk1+2 yields A− 1 (at least 2 · (A− 1)) more
points against non-observing opponents who cooperate at all horizons larger than k1+1,
and it yields at most 1 (2) less points against any other opponents. Thus:
η · (1− p) · (A− 1) ≤ 1− η · (1− p) ⇔ η · (1− p) · A ≤ 1 (1− p) ⇔ η ≤ 1
(1− p) · A.
Substituting (A.3) yields:
(A− 1) · (1− p)− 1
(A− 1) · (1− p) ≤
1
(1− p) · A ⇔ A · ((A− 1) · (1− p)− 1) ≤ A− 1
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A · (A− 1) · (1− p)− A ≤ A− 1 ⇔ A · (A− 1) · (1− p) ≤ 2 · A− 1
1− p ≤ 2 · A− 1
A · (A− 1) ⇔ p ≥ 1−
2 · A− 1
A2 − A ,
and we get a contradiction to p < 1 − 2·A−1
A2−A . By part (2) of Lemma 3, all non-naive
incumbents defect with probability 1 at any horizon of at most k1 + 1. This implies
that η of the non-naive incumbents play dk1+1 against cooperative strangers and the
remaining fraction plays dk1+2 .
3. The proof repeats the argument of part (2) of Lemma 4.
4. The proof repeats the argument of part (3) of Lemma 4.
The following corollary is immediately implied by Lemmas 3-6:
Corollary 1. Let
max
(
1
A− 2 ,
2 · A− 1
A · (A− 1)
)
< p <
A− 1
A
or
1
(A− 1) · (M − 2) < p < 1−
2 · A− 1
A2 − A ,
let δ > 0 be suﬃciently small, let (µ, β) 6≈ (µ∗, b∗) be a stable proper neutrally stable conﬁg-
uration, and let Lk1 ∈ C (µ) the lowest incumbent (naive). Then:
1. µ (Lk1) < 1.
2. All non-naive incumbents either play dk1+1 or dk1+2 against cooperative strangers.
3. µ (Lk) = 0 for every k > k1 + 3.
4. If p > 1
(A−1)2 then k1 = 1.
Note that if A > 4.57 than
max
(
1
A− 2 ,
2 · A− 1
A · (A− 1)
)
< 1− 2 · A− 1
A2 − A ,
which implies that Corollary 1 is valid in this case for each 1
(A−1)·(M−2) < p <
A−1
A
.
Finally, Lemma 7 shows that the conﬁgurations characterized by Corollary 1 cannot be
proper evolutionary stable. To simplify notation the lemma describes the case in which
Lk1 = L1 but it works the same (only with more cumbersome notations) for Lk1 > L1
(which is possible when p < 1
(A−1)2 ). Lemma 7 is not valid for the notion of DEY-stability
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(Section 6.3) due to: (1) the assumption that the incumbents ﬁx they pre-entry play against
incumbents and strangers, and (2) the assumption that internal mutant conﬁgurations (of
existing types) can be heterogeneous.
Lemma 7. Let 0 < p < A−1
A
, let δ > 0 be suﬃciently small, let (µ, β) be a conﬁguration
satisfying: (1) L1 ∈ C (µ), (2) µ (L1) < 1, (3) µ (Lk) = 0 ∀k > 4, and (4) a positive fraction
of non-naive incumbents play d3 against cooperative strangers, and the remaining non-naive
players play d2 against cooperative strangers. Then (µ, β) cannot be proper neutrally stable.
Proof. Assume to the contrary that (µ, β) is a proper neutrally stable conﬁguration.
1. All players who play d2 against cooperative strangers have type L2.
Assume to the contrary that there is a type Lk˜ (k˜ > 2) that plays d2 with positive
probability against strangers (and by the previous lemma it plays d3 with the remaining
probability). Consider the following conﬁguration of mutants: (µ′, b′): (1) µ′ = µ , (2)
for each k 6= k˜, b′k = bk, (3) for each Lk ∈ L, b′k˜ (k) = bk˜ (k), and (4) b′k˜ (∅) = d3. That
is, the mutants have the same distribution of types as the incumbents, and they play
the same except that mutants of type Lk˜ always play d3 when facing strangers. Observe
that such mutants would outperform the incumbents: mutants of type diﬀerent than
Lk˜ obtain the same payoﬀ as their counter incumbents, mutants of type Lk˜ would
achieve a strictly higher payoﬀ when facing an unobserved opponent of type Lk˜ (pre-
entry both d2 and d3 yielded the same payoﬀ; post-entry there are a bit more early
defectors and thus d3 yield a strictly higher payoﬀ), and would obtain the same payoﬀ
in all other cases. This implies that the conﬁguration cannot be neutrally-stable.
2. β is characterized as follows: type L1 always plays d1; type L2 always plays d2; type
L3 plays d2 against observed L1 and play d3 in each other case; and type L4 plays
d2 against observed L1, d3 against strangers and observed L2, and plays d4 against
observed L4 or L3 (all strategies are determined up to oﬀ-equilibrium-path deviations
that do not change the observable play).
The strategies that are used against strangers are determined by the previous part
and by Lemma 3. The strategies that are used against observed incumbents are best
replies if p < A−1
A
by the same argument as in part (1) of Lemma 4.
3. µ (L3) = 0.
By a similar argument to part (2) of Lemma 4, agents of type L4 outperform agents
of type L3 due to their unique ability to play d4 against an observed type L3 or L4.
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4. To simplify notation we characterize the frequency of each type in the case where the
cognitive costs converge to 0 (δ → o). The arguments work very similarly (but the
notation is more cumbersome) for for small enough δ > 0. Then:
µ (L1) =
1
A+ p · (1− p) · (A− 1)2 , µ (L2) = 1−
1 + A− p · (A− 1)
A+ p · (1− p) · (A− 1)2 ,
µ (L4) =
1
p · (A− 1) + 1 .
Let µk = µ (Lk). The fact that (µ, b) is a balanced conﬁguration implies that types
L1 and L2 should have the same payoﬀ. Type L2 obtains 1 more ﬁtness point against
types L1 and L2, the same payoﬀ against an unobserving type L4, and A−1 less points
against an observing type L4. The balance between the payoﬀs implies:
(1− µ4) = µ4 · p · (A− 1) ⇔ µ4 = 1
p · (A− 1) + 1 . (A.4)
Similarly, L2 and L4 should have the same payoﬀ. Type L2 obtains 1 less point against
type L2, the same against observed type L1, A − 1 more points against unobserved
type L1, and the comparison against opponent of type L4 depends on the observability:
A − 2 more points when both types are observed, 1 less point when both types are
unobserved, 2 less points when only the opponent was observed, and A−1 more points
when only the opponent was observing. Thus, the balance between the payoﬀs implies:
(1− p) · µ1 · (A− 1) + µ4 ·
(
p2 · (A− 2)− (1− p)2 + p · (1− p) · (A− 1− 2)) = µ2
(1− p) · µ1 · (A− 1) + µ4 ·
(
p2 · (A− 3)− 1 + 2p+ (p− p2) · (A− 3)) = µ2
(1− p) · µ1 · (A− 1) + µ4 · (p · (A− 3)− 1 + 2p) = µ2
(1− p) · µ1 · (A− 1) + µ4 · (p · (A− 1)− 1) = µ2 = 1− µ1 − µ4
µ4·p·(A− 1) = 1−µ1·(1 + (1− p) · (A− 1)) ⇔ µ4·p·(A− 1) = 1−µ1·(A− p · (A− 1))
µ1 · (A− p · (A− 1)) = 1− µ4 · p · (A− 1) ⇔ µ1 = 1− µ4 · p · (A− 1)
A− p · (A− 1)
Substituting (A.4) yields:
µ1 =
1− p·(A−1)
p·(A−1)+1
A− p · (A− 1) =
1
p·(A−1)+1
A− p · (A− 1)
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µ1 =
1
(p · (A− 1) + 1) · (A− p · (A− 1)) =
1
A+ p · (1− p) · (A− 1)2 .
This implies that:
µ2 = 1− µ1 − µ4 = 1− 1
(p · (A− 1) + 1) · (A− p · (A− 1)) −
1
p · (A− 1) + 1
µ2 = 1− 1 + A− p · (A− 1)
(p · (A− 1) + 1) · (A− p · (A− 1)) = 1−
1 + A− p · (A− 1)
(p · (A− 1) + 1) · (A− p · (A− 1))
µ2 = 1− 1 + A− p · (A− 1)
A+ p · (1− p) · (A− 1)2 .
If any of the µi-s is not between 0 and 1 then no neutrally stable conﬁguration exists.
5. The conﬁguration is not neutrally stable.
A direct algebraic calculation reveals that for a suﬃciently small , ′ > 0:
(a) If p < 0.5 then  imitating mutants (who play the same strategies as the in-
cumbents) with conﬁguration (µ′, b′) with µ′ (L1) = 1 − µ (L4) + ′, µ′ (L2) = 0,
µ′ (L4) = µ (L4) − ′, and b′ = b (play the same as the incumbents) outperform
the incumbents in the post-entry population.
(b) If p > 0.5  imitating mutants with a conﬁguration (µ′, b′) with µ′ (L1) = 0,
µ′ (L2) = 1−µ (L4)+′, µ′ (L4) = µ (L4)−′, and b′ = b outperform the incumbents
post-entry population for suﬃciently small .
A.5 Stable Conﬁgurations Near 0 and 1
Theorem. 3 (parts 1 and 4)
1. Let 0 ≤ p < 1
(M−2)·(A−1) . Then there exists a proper neutrally stable conﬁguration(
µ˜, b˜
)
where all players have type LM and they play dM against strangers and type
LM , and dk+1 against observed mutant type Lk < LM . Moreover, any other neutrally
stable conﬁguration is equivalent to
(
µ˜, b˜
)
.
2. (part (4) in the main text) Let A−1
A
< p ≤ 1. Then in any proper neutrally stable
conﬁguration there is a positive frequency of players of type LM , and these players
defect at all stages when observing an opponent of type LM .
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Proof.
1. We begin by showing the stability of the conﬁguration in which all players have type
LM and they defect at all stages. It is immediate that player best reply to each
other. Consider  mutants with type k < L who invade the population. When facing
incumbents, the mutants obtain 1 ﬁtness point less when their type is unobserved, and
(A− 1) · (M − k − 1) − 1 more ﬁtness points when their type is observed. Thus for
suﬃciently small  and δ, the incumbents achieve a strictly lower payoﬀ if:
(1− p) > p · ((A− 1) · (M − k − 1)− 1) ⇔ 1 > p · (A− 1) · (M − k − 1)
p <
1
(A− 1) · (M − k − 1) .
This implies that for any p < 1
(M−2)·(A−1) , the conﬁguration is proper neutrally stable.
The uniqueness is immediately implied by Lemmas 3-7, which show that no conﬁgu-
ration can be proper neutrally stable for p < A
(A−1)2 .
2. Let Lk be the highest type in the population. Let l be the largest horizon in which Lk
begins defecting with positive probability against an observed cooperative opponent of
the same type. If this probability is strictly less than 1, then by a similar argument to
Part (1) of Lemma 7, the conﬁguration is not neutrally stable ( imitating mutants
who diﬀer only in that their Lk-s play dl with probability 1 would achieve a strictly
higher payoﬀ in the post-entry population). Now, if l < k, then  mutants of type
Lk who play dl+1 (start defecting one stage earlier) against observed Lk, and play the
same as the incumbents in all other cases, would outperform the incumbents of type
Lk (and this implies they would outperform all incumbents) if:
p > (1− p) · (A− 1) ⇔ p · A > (A− 1) ⇔ p > A− 1
A
(because the mutants obtain 1 more point when their Lk opponent observes their type,
and they get at most A − 1 less points when he does not observe their type; they
obtain the same payoﬀ against strangers and other observed opponents). From similar
reasons, If l = k < M , then  mutants of type Lk+1 who play dk+1 against observed Lk,
and play the same as the incumbents of type Lk in all other cases, would outperform
incumbents of type Lk (and this implies they would outperform all incumbents) in any
proper neutrally stable conﬁguration.
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